American USSR: America's Lies and Deceptions: Gulf of Tonkin

• Wikipedia, The Faked Gulf of Tonkin Incident Ignited an American USSR War
  The Tonkin Gulf Resolution (officially, Asia Resolution, Public Law 88-408) was a joint resolution which the United States Congress passed on August 7, 1964 in response to a sea battle between the North Vietnamese Navy's Torpedo Squadron 135[1] and the destroyer USS Maddox on August 2 and an alleged second naval engagement between North Vietnamese boats and the US destroyers USS Maddox and USS Turner Joy on August 4 in the Tonkin Gulf; both naval actions are known collectively as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution is of historical significance because it gave U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson authorization, without a formal declaration of war by Congress, for the use of conventional military force in Southeast Asia. Specifically, the resolution authorized the President to do whatever necessary in order to assist "any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty." This included involving armed forces. The unanimous affirmative vote in the House of Representatives was 416-0. (However, Congressman Eugene Siler of Kentucky, who was not present but opposed the measure, was "paired" with another member who favored the resolution — i.e., his opposition was not counted, but the vote in favor was one less than it would have been.)[2] It was opposed in the Senate only by Senators Wayne Morse (D–OR) and Ernest Gruening (D–AK). Senator Gruening objected to "sending our American boys into combat in a war in which we have no business, which is not our war, into which we have been misguidedly drawn, which is steadily being escalated."[3] The Johnson administration subsequently relied upon the resolution to begin its rapid escalation of U.S. military involvement in South Vietnam and open warfare between North Vietnam and the United States. more...
   

• U.S. Navy
  A clash between naval forces of the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) in August 1964 marked a significant turning point in the Cold War struggle for Southeast Asia. President Lyndon B. Johnson and his Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, grew concerned in early 1964 that the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), America's ally, was losing its fight against Communist Viet Cong guerrillas. The American leaders decided to put military pressure on Ho Chi Minh's North Vietnamese government in Hanoi, which directed and provided military support for the Communists in the South. Johnson, McNamara, and their advisors believed that naval forces could be used to help compel Ho Chi Minh to cease his support for the Viet Cong. The U.S. Navy armed the Republic of Vietnam Navy with Norwegian-built fast patrol boats (PTF), trained their Vietnamese crews, and maintained the vessels at Danang in northern South Vietnam. In covert operation 34A, which was designed and directed by American officials in Washington and Saigon, the PTFs bombarded radar stations on the coast of North Vietnam and landed South Vietnamese commandoes to destroy bridges and other military targets. Many of the missions, however, failed for lack of good intelligence about the enemy's key military installations, defensive forces, and operating methods. more...
   

• Essay: 40th Anniversary of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident by John Prados
  American pilots from the carrier USS Ticonderoga sent to help defend the destroyers from their supposed attackers told the same story. Commander James B. Stockdale, who led this flight of jets, spotted no enemy, and at one point saw the Turner Joy pointing her guns at the Maddox. As Stockdale, who retired an admiral after a distinguished career that included being shot down and imprisoned by the North Vietnamese, later wrote: "There was absolutely no gunfire except our own, no PT boat wakes, not a candle light let alone a burning ship. None could have been there and not have been seen on such a black night." (Note 7) In his memoir, Stockdale also remarked on the situation: "I had the best seat in the house from which to detect boats-if there were any. I didn't have to look through surface haze and spray like the destroyers did, and yet I could see the destroyers' every move vividly." (Note 8) These comments reinforce the dispatches from the Navy's on-scene commander, Captain John Herrick, who after filing various reports of attacks sent a cable that questioned them all. A Top Secret August 28, 1964 chronology prepared for President Johnson summarized Herrick's report, sent at 1:27 p.m. Washington time on August 4, as follows: "a review of the action makes many reported contacts and torpedoes fired 'appear doubtful'. 'Freak weather effects' on radar, and 'over-eager' sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. 'No visual sightings' have been reported by the Maddox, and the Commander suggests that a 'complete evaluation' be undertaken before any further action." But Washington had already decided to strike North Vietnam. more...
   

• State Department - Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS): "U.S. Reaction To Events in the Gulf of Tonkin, August 1-10"
  With all frankness I must say that if these actions of American warships and air forces pursue the aim of strengthening somehow the position of the corrupt and rotten South Vietnamese regime which exists--and this is no secret to anyone--only because of the foreign support, then such actions will not achieve the given aim. But to increase the danger of a serious military conflict--they can. A question arises before me: have not clouds been deliberately darkened around the developments in the Gulf of Tonkin? Is not the influence felt here by those quarters and persons who do not conceal their desire to inflame the passions, to pour oil on the flame and whose militant frame of mind one should regard with great caution and restraint? But if this influence is indeed real and if it has an ear, then another, more serious question arises--where the present developments can lead to? more...
   

• Memorandum for the Record of White House Staff Meeting, Washington, August 5, 1964, 8 a.m.. Source: Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-202-69. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by William Y. Smith.
  PDF Fax of White House Meeting on Tonkin. more...
   

• Tonkin Gulf Intelligence "Skewed" According to Official History and Intercepts, Newly Declassified National Security Agency Documents Show Analysts Made "SIGINT fit the claim" of North Vietnamese Attack. This is an admission of the United States lying about Tonkin to start the war criminal death dance of the 20 year Vietnam War. more...
   

• Gulf of Tonkin Signals Intercepts, Source: LBJ Library: LBJF: NSF: CFVN, b. 77, f, "3A(3) Gulf of Tonkin, 8/64."
  This link is to actual .pdf files of faxsimilies of the actually recording intercepts during the Gulf of Tonkin. more...
   

• LBJ Tapes on Gulf of Tonkin, Source: John Prados, The White House Tapes (New York: The New Press, 2003)
  Actual PDF study file of transcripts. more...
   

• CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate on possible North Vietnamese responses to U.S. actions, May 1964
  Foreign Relations assessment of the Gulf of Tonkin lies and the war itself from the U.S. Department of State, a tool of the American Imperial regime. more...
   

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