Between Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in
August 1990, and the commencement of
military action in January 1991, then
President George H.W. Bush raised the
specter of the Iraqi pursuit of nuclear
weapons as one justification for taking
decisive action against Iraq. In the
then-classified National Security
Directive 54, signed on January 15,
1991, authorizing the use of force to
expel Iraq from Kuwait, he identified
Iraqi use of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) against allied forces as an action
that would lead the U.S. to seek the
removal of Saddam Hussein from power. (Note
1)
In the aftermath of Iraq's defeat,
the U.S.-led U.N. coalition was able to
compel Iraq to agree to an inspection
and monitoring regime, intended to
insure that Iraq dismantled its WMD
programs and did not take actions to
reconstitute them. The means of
implementing the relevant U.N.
resolutions was the Special Commission
on Iraq (UNSCOM). That inspection regime
continued until December 16, 1998 -
although it involved interruptions,
confrontations, and Iraqi attempts at
denial and deception - when UNSCOM
withdrew from Iraq in the face of Iraqi
refusal to cooperate, and harassment.
Subsequent to George W. Bush's
assumption of the presidency in January
2001, the U.S. made it clear that it
would not accept what had become the
status quo with respect to Iraq - a
country ruled by Saddam Hussein and free
to attempt to reconstitute its assorted
weapons of mass destruction programs. As
part of their campaign against the
status quo, which included the clear
threat of the eventual use of military
force against the Iraqi regime, the U.S.
and Britain published documents and
provided briefings detailing their
conclusions concerning Iraq's WMD
programs and its attempts to deceive
other nations about those programs.
As a result of the U.S. and British
campaign, and after prolonged
negotiations between the United States,
Britain, France, Russia and other U.N.
Security Council members, the United
Nations declared that Iraq would have to
accept even more intrusive inspections
than under the previous inspection
regime - to be carried out by the U.N.
Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection
Commission (UNMOVIC) and the
International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) - or face "serious consequences."
Iraq agreed to accept the U.N. decision
and inspections resumed in late November
2002. On December 7, 2002, Iraq
submitted its 12,000 page declaration,
which claimed that it had no current WMD
programs. Intelligence analysts from the
United States and other nations
immediately began to scrutinize the
document, and senior U.S. officials
quickly rejected the claims. (Note
2)
Over the next several months,
inspections continued in Iraq, and the
chief inspectors, Hans Blix (UNMOVIC)
and Mohammed El Baradei (IAEA) provided
periodic updates to the U.N. Security
Council concerning the extent of Iraqi
cooperation, what they had or had not
discovered, and what they believed
remained to be done. During that period
the Bush administration, as well as the
Tony Blair administration in the United
Kingdom, charged that Iraq was not
living up to the requirement that it
fully disclose its WMD activities, and
declared that if it continued along that
path, "serious consequences" - that is,
invasion - should follow.
The trigger for military action
preferred by the British government,
other allies, and at least some segments
of the Bush administration, was a second
U.N. resolution that would authorize an
armed response. Other key U.N. Security
Council members - including France,
Germany, and Russia - argued that the
inspections were working and that the
inspectors should be allowed to
continue. When it became apparent that
the Council would not approve a second
resolution, the United States and
Britain terminated their attempts to
obtain it. Instead, they, along with
other allies, launched Operation Iraqi
Freedom on March 19, 2003 - a military
campaign that quickly brought about the
end of Saddam Hussein's regime and
ultimately resulted in his capture. (Note
3)
As U.S. forces moved through Iraq,
there were initial reports that chemical
or biological weapons might have been
uncovered, but closer examinations
produced negative results. In May 2003,
the Bush administration decided to
establish a specialized group of about
1,500 individuals, the Iraq Survey Group
(ISG), to search the country for WMD -
replacing the 75th Exploitation Task
Force, which had originally been
assigned the mission. Appointed to lead
the Group, whose motto is "find,
exploit, eliminate," was Maj. Gen. Keith
Dayton, the head of the Defense
Intelligence Agency's Directorate of
Operations. In June, David Kay, who
served as a U.N. weapons inspector after
Operation Desert Storm, was appointed
special advisor and traveled to Iraq to
lead the search. (Note
4)
By the time of the creation of the
ISG, and continuing to the date of this
publication, a controversy has existed
over the performance of U.S. (and
British) intelligence in collecting and
evaluating information about Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction programs.
The reliability of sources has been
questioned. It has been suggested that
some human intelligence may have been
purposeful deception by the Iraqi
intelligence and security services,
while exiles and defectors may have
provided other intelligence seeking to
influence U.S. policy.
The quality of the intelligence
analysis has also come under scrutiny.
The failure to find weapons stocks or
active production lines, undermining
claims by the October 2002 NIE and both
President Bush and Secretary of State
Colin Powell (Document
16,
Document 27), has been one
particular cause for criticism.
Controversy has also centered around
specific judgments - in the United
States with regard to assessments of
Iraq's motives for seeking high-strength
aluminum tubes, and in the United
Kingdom with respect to the government's
claim that Iraq sought to acquire
uranium from Africa. Post-war evaluation
of captured material, particularly two
mobile facilities that the CIA and DIA
judged to be biological weapons
laboratories, has also been the subject
of dispute. (Note
5)
In addition, members of Congress and
Parliament, as well as potential
political opponents and outside
observers have criticized the use of
intelligence by the Bush and Blair
administrations. Charges have included
outright distortion, selective use of
intelligence, and exertion of political
pressure to influence the content of
intelligence estimates in order to
provide support to the decision to go to
war with Iraq. (Note
6)
The material presented in this
electronic briefing book includes both
essential pre-war documentation and
documents produced or released
subsequent to the start of military
action in March 2003. Pre-war
documentation includes the major
unclassified U.S. and British
assessments of Iraq's WMD programs; the
IAEA and UNSCOM reports covering the
final period prior to their 1998
departure, and between November 27,
2002, and February 2003; the transcript
of a key speech by President Bush; a
statement of U.S. policy toward
combating WMD; the transcript of and
slides for Secretary Powell's
presentation to the U.N. on February 5,
2003; and documents from the 1980s and
1990's concerning various aspects of
Iraqi WMD activities.
Key documentation related to the
controversy that has become available in
recent months makes up almost of all of
the 14 additional documents contained in
this updated briefing book. These
records include:
- The full Top Secret key
judgments section of the October
2002 National Intelligence Estimate
on Iraq's Continuing Programs for
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Document
15)
- The CIA-DIA evaluation of two
specialized tractor-trailers (Document
32)
- Reviews by the British
parliamentary committees concerning
the quality and use of intelligence
on Iraq by the British government (Document
34,
Document 36)
- David Kay's unclassified
statement on the ISG's interim
findings (Document
39)
- Congressional critiques of U.S.
intelligence performance (Document
37,
Document 41)
- Administration rebuttals of
those and other critiques. (Document
35,
Document 38,
Document 40,
Document 43).
Much that is of interest concerning
intelligence and Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction has appeared in articles,
monographs, and studies published by
magazines or research groups. A list of
key publications is provided immediately
after the notes section. Other important
materials have been posted temporarily
on government web sites. The
documentation provided in this briefing
book collects many of the most
significant of these records in one
place, allowing readers to substantially
augment their understanding of the
issues by directly comparing the
different sources and conclusions, and
ensuring that these materials will be
accessible for the long term.
Note: The
following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download
and install the free
Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.
Read the
Documents
Document 1: Interagency Intelligence
Assessment, Implications of Israeli
Attack on Iraq, July 1, 1981. Secret.
Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room,
released under the Freedom of Information
Act
On June 7, 1981, in an attempt to
prevent Iraqi acquisition of a nuclear
weapons capability, Israeli aircraft
bombed Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor,
before it became operational. This
assessment, produced by the CIA and
other U.S. intelligence agencies,
examines Arab reactions to the attack as
well as both the immediate and
short-term repercussions of the
pre-emptive strike.
Document 2: CIA, Iraq's
National Security Goals, December 1988.
Secret.
Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room,
released by Mandatory Declassification
Review
Written after the conclusion of the
1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, this CIA survey
examined Saddam Hussein's likely
regional and international objectives
and strategies - including his relations
with other Arab states and the PLO, his
desire to reduce Iraqi dependence on the
USSR, and his goal of preventing closer
ties between the US and USSR and Iran.
With respect to weapons of mass
destruction, the analysis briefly
discusses Iraqi attitudes toward
chemical and nuclear weapons. The first
are considered a "short-term fix," while
the latter represent "the long-term
deterrent."
Document 3: CIA, Iraqi
Ballistic Missile Developments, July
1990. Top Secret
Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room,
released under the Freedom of Information
Act
During the Persian Gulf War, Iraq
made extensive use of its Scud missile
force to attack both Israel and Saudi
Arabia - a Scud that hit a U.S. barracks
in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killed 28 U.S.
servicemen. This paper completed a month
prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait noted
that "Iraq has the most aggressive and
advanced ballistic missile development
program in the Arab world" and that it
already had two modified versions of the
Scud B - the Al Husayn and Al Abbas.
The paper examines the origins,
development, and results of the Iraqi
missile program - in the form of the
Scud B and its variants. It also
examines warhead options - including
chemical, biological, and nuclear. In
addition, it discusses Iraq's missile
production infrastructure as well as
foreign assistance to the missile
program.
Document 4: Central Intelligence
Agency, Prewar Status of Iraq's Weapons
of Mass Destruction, March 1991, Top
Secret.
Source: Freedom of Information Act
This study, completed by the CIA's
Office of Scientific and Weapons
Research after the conclusion of the
first Persian Gulf War, examined the
status of the four components of Iraq's
WMD programs -- chemical weapons,
biological weapons, nuclear weapons, and
ballistic missiles -- as of January 15,
1991, the day President George H.W. Bush
signed National Security Directive 54,
authorizing the use of force to drive
Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
The report asserted that Iraq
apparently believed that it needed
chemical weapons both as a deterrent and
to fulfill its role as "protector" of
the Arab world. There were strong
indications, according to the report,
that Iraq was prepared to use chemical
weapons in any conflict with the United
States. The author(s) characterized
Iraq's biological weapons program as
"the most extensive in the Arab world."
With respect to nuclear weapons, the
report concluded that Iraq probably had
the capability, if combined with
clandestinely acquired foreign
technology, to develop nuclear weapons
in the late 1990s. Iraq's ballistic
missile program was "the most advanced
in the Arab world," the report also
concluded.
Document 5: CIA, Project Babylon:
The Iraqi Supergun, November 1991.
Secret.
Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room,
released by Mandatory Declassification
Review
From 1988 to 1990, Iraq was involved
in an unusual weapons program, codenamed
Project Babylon. The project's objective
was the development and production of
several large caliber guns, including a
1,000-millimeter-diameter supergun. In
addition, the project included
development of both conventional and
rocket projectiles for the gun. The gun
was intended to deliver the explosive
devices to military and economic targets
up to 620 miles away. The project was
being managed for Iraq by a foreign
company, Space Research Corporation,
headed by Gerald Bull.
By early 1990, a 350-mm-diameter
version of the gun had been successfully
built and tested. In addition, many of
the components for the 1,000-mm. gun and
two other 350-mm guns had been delivered
to Iraq. In March 1990, Bull was
murdered. The following month, the
United Kingdom customs service seized
the final eight sections that were to be
used in the 1,000-mm. gun barrel. Other
nations followed by seizing other
components of the supergun. The seizures
prevented Iraq from completing the
project. In July 1991, after initial
denials, Iraq acknowledged the project.
In October 1991, Project Babylon
components were destroyed under U.N.
supervision.
This document discusses the
rationale, origins, technical details,
and history of Project Babylon.
Document 6: CIA, Iraqi BW
Mission Planning, 1992. Secret.
Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room,
released under the Freedom of Information
Act
This information report states that
in the fall of 1990, Saddam Hussein
ordered that plans be drawn up for the
airborne delivery of an unspecified
biological agent. The probable target
was Israel. The plan envisioned a
conventional air raid employing three
MiG-21s, to be followed by another raid
involving three MiGs and a SU-22
aircraft that would disperse the
biological agent.The first mission was
shot down over the Persian Gulf and "no
efforts were made to find another method
to deliver the BW agent."
Document 7: United Nations, Note
by the Secretary General, October 8,
1997 w/att: Letter dated 6 October 1997
from the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency to the
Secretary General.
Source:
http://www.iaea.org
Part of one of the report describes
the work done by the IAEA, during the
period April 1, 1997 to October 1, 1997
in montoring and verifying Iraqi
compliance with the nuclear disarmament
provisions of U.N. resolution 687
(1991). It includes an extensive summary
of the technical discussions between
IAEA and Iraq. The second part of the
report provides an overview of IAEA
activities since 1991 related to on-site
inspection of Iraqi's nuclear
capabilities and the destruction,
removal, or neutralization of Iraqi
nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons
related material or facilities.
Document 8: United Nations,
Note by the Secretary General, October
6, 1998 w/att: Report of the Executive
Chairman of the activities of the Special
Commission established by the
Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9(b)
(i) of the resolution 687 (1991).
Source:
http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/sres98-920.htm
This report from the executive
chairman of the UN Special Commission on
Iraq (UNSCOM) covers developments in the
relationship between Iraq and the
Commission, priority issues with respect
to disarmament, and ongoing monitoring
and verification activities through
October 11, 1998. Two months later, on
December 16, UNSCOM, in the face of
Iraqi refusal to cooperate, withdrew its
staff from Iraq.
Document 9: United Nations
Security Council, Letter Dated 8 February
1999 from the Secretary-General Addressed to
the President of the Security Council,
February 9, 1999 w/enc: Report of the
Director General of the International Atomic
Energy Agency in connection with the panel
on disarmament and current and future
ongoing monitoring and verification issues
(S/1999/100).
Source:
http://www.iaea.org
This report summarizes the status of
the International Atomic Energy Agency's
implementation of U.N. Security Council
resolutions concerning the dismantling
of Iraq's nuclear program as of February
1999 - two months after U.N. inspectors
were withdrawn from Iraq. It includes an
examination of the remaining questions
and concerns and their impact on the
IAEA's ability to develop a "technically
coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine
nuclear weapons [program] and on the
IAEA's technical ability to fully
implement its OMV [on-site monitoring
and verification] program."
Specific questions and concerns noted
in the report include: lack of certain
technical documentation, external
assistance to Iraq's clandestine nuclear
weapons program, and Iraq's inability to
provide documentation showing the timing
and modalities of its alleged
abandonment of its nuclear weapons
program.
Document 10a: Forged correspondence
to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of
Niger, concerning visit to Niger by Iraqi
ambassador to the Vatican, February 1, 1999.
Document 10b: Forged correspondence
within Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic
of Niger, concerning transfer of uranium to
Iraq, July 30, 1999.
Document 10c: Forged letter to the
President, Republic of Niger, concerning
agreement to supply 500 tons of uranium per
year to Iraq, July 27, 2000.
Document 10d: Forged letter to the
Niger Ambassador to Italy, concerning
protocol of agreement to supply uranium to
Iraq, October 10, 2000.
Source: Documents provided by journalist
The only publicly acknowledged
evidence for the claim that Iraq had
tried to acquire uranium from Africa,
which President Bush made in his January
28, 2003 State of the Union address,
based on British intelligence
information, are these documents that
were claimed to have been official
correspondence involving officials of
the Republic of Niger. The charge that
Iraq had sought to purchase uranium had
been deleted from a previous speech due
to the CIA's objection that the
information had not been confirmed.
Documents 10a-10d were all determined
to be crude forgeries - which included
names and titles that did not match the
individuals who held office at the time
the letters were purportedly written -
although the British government has
insisted it has additional information
that would support the claim that Iraq
was seeking to purchase uranium. The
inclusion of the claim in the State of
the Union despite its removal from an
earlier speech, combined with the
revelation of the forged documents,
produced further criticism of the Bush
administration and CIA Director George
Tenet. Tenet, and then the president,
took responsibility for the inclusion of
the unvetted information. An FBI
investigation into the apparent forgery
that commenced in the spring of 2003 is
now "at a critical stage" according the
Washington Post (Mike Allen and
Susan Schmidt, "Bush Aides Testify in
Leak Probe," Washington Post,
Tuesday, February 10, 2004; Page A01).
Document 11: UK Joint
Intelligence Committee, Iraq's Weapons of
Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the
British Government, September 2002.
Unclassified.
Source:
http://www.pm.gov.uk
This extensive analysis of Iraqi WMD
programs was produced by the British
Government's Joint Intelligence
Committee, which is responsible for
overseeing the production of national
and strategic intelligence. One part of
the document focuses on Iraqi chemical,
biological, nuclear, and ballistic
missile programs for the years 1971-1998
and in the post-inspection era
(1998-2002). Other parts of the document
concern the history of UN weapons
inspections and "Iraq under Saddam
Hussein."
In the foreword, Prime Minister Tony
Blair writes (p.3) that "In recent
months, I have been increasingly alarmed
by the evidence from inside Iraq that
... Saddam Hussein is continuing to
develop WMD, and with them the ability
to inflict real damage upon the region,
and the stability of the world."
Document 12: Defense Intelligence
Agency, Iraq - Key WMD Facilities - An
Operational Support Study, September
2002 (Extract) Unclassified.
Source:
http://www.dia.mil
This extract is part of a larger DIA
study, produced for the United States
Central Command to assist it in planning
military operations. It notes the
absence of reliable information on
whether Iraq was producing and
stockpiling chemical weapons. The
authors do express their belief that
"Iraq retained production equipment,
expertise and chemical precursors and
can reconstitute a chemical warfare
program in the absence of an
international inspection regime." It
also summarizes intelligence on possible
chemical weapons activities, such as
renovation of two facilities formerly
associated with the Iraqi chemical
weapons program.
Document 13: U.S. State Department,
A Decade of Deception and Defiance,
September 12, 2002. Unclassified.
Source:
http://www.whitehouse.gov
Three pages of this document focus on
U.S. charges concerning Iraqi failure to
comply with the restrictions pertaining
to weapons of mass destruction placed
upon it as a result of the Persian Gulf
War. It charges, inter alia, that "Iraq
is believed to be developing ballistic
missiles with a range greater than 150
kilometers - as prohibited by UN
Security Council Resolution 687" and
"Iraq has stepped up its quest for
nuclear weapons and has embarked on a
worldwide hunt for materials to make an
atomic bomb." With respect to chemical
weapons, it charges that "Iraq has not
accounted for hundreds of tons of
chemical precursors and tens of
thousands of unfilled munitions,
including Scud variant missile
warheads."
Document 14: CIA, Iraq's
Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs,
October 2002, Unclassified.
Source:
http://www.cia.gov
Issued a month after the British
assessment (see Document 8), this CIA
study is the unclassified version of a
Top Secret National Intelligence
Estimate completed shortly before its
release. The study contains analysis,
maps, tables, and some satellite
photographs of apparent Iraqi WMD sites.
Among the study's key judgments is
the statement that "Iraq has continued
its weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
programs in defiance of UN resolutions
and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical
and biological weapons as well as
missiles with ranges in execess of UN
restrictions; if left unchecked, it
probably will have a nuclear weapon
during this decade."
Document 15: Director of Central
Intelligence, National Intelligence
Estimate, Iraq's Continuing Programs for
Weapons of Mass Destruction, October
2002. Top
Secret (Extract).
Source: The White House
In response to the post-war
controversy over U.S. intelligence
estimates of Iraqi WMD programs, the
White House released the entire key
judgments section of the Top Secret
October 2002 national intelligence
estimate on the subject. (An
unclassified version of the NIE had been
released that same month, see Document
14).
The estimate concluded that Iraq
continued its weapons of mass
destruction programs despite U.N.
resolutions and sanctions and that it
was in possession of chemical and
biological weapons as well as missiles
with ranges exceeding U.N. imposed
limits. In addition, it was judged that
Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear
weapons program and, if left unchecked,
would probably have a nuclear weapon
before the end of the decade - assuming
it had to produce the fissile material
indigenously. If Iraq could acquire
sufficient fissile material from abroad
it could construct a nuclear weapon
within several months to a year, the
estimate reported.
With regard to both chemical and
biological weapons, the NIE reported not
only that Iraq had maintained stocks of
the weapons but was actively engaged in
production. The released section
contains the assessment, based at least
in part on human intelligence, that
"Baghdad has begun renewed production
of" a variety of chemical weapons -
mustard gas, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX.
It also stated that all key aspects of
Iraq's offensive biological weapons
program were active - including R&D,
production, and weaponization - and that
most components were larger and more
advanced than they were before the Gulf
War. It also reported that Iraq
possessed mobile facilities for
producing bacterial and toxin biological
warfare agents.
The estimate also examined Iraq's
possible willingness to engage in
terrorist strikes against the U.S.
homeland and whether Saddam would assist
al-Qaeda in conducting additional
attacks on U.S. territory. Iraq would
probably attempt clandestine attacks in
the United States if it feared an attack
that threatened the survival of the
regime were imminent or unavoidable,
probably with biological agents,
according to the NIE. In addition, in
the event that Saddam concluded that
al-Qaeda was the only organization that
could conduct the type of terrorist
strike against the U.S. that he wished
to see take place, he might take "the
extreme step of assisting the Islamist
terrorists."
The released key judgments section is
also notable for its reporting of
dissents within the Intelligence
Community on two related issues - when
Iraq could acquire a nuclear weapon, and
its motive in seeking to obtain
high-strength aluminum tubes. The State
Department's Bureau of Intelligence
Research (INR) argued that while Saddam
wished to acquire a nuclear weapon, it
did not believe that Iraq's recent
activities made a compelling case that a
comprehensive attempt to acquire nuclear
weapons was being made. INR, along with
the Department of Energy, questioned
whether the high-strength aluminum tubes
Iraq had been attempting to acquire were
well-suited for use in gas centrifuges
used for uranium enrichment.
Document 16: The White House,
"President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat,"
October 7, 2002. Unclassified.
Source:
http://www.whitehouse.gov
This speech, given by President Bush
at the Cincinnati Museum Center,
presents his administration's view
concerning the threat from Iraq. It
discusses Iraqi chemical, biological,
ballistic missile, and nuclear programs
- as well as concerns about possible
Iraqi connections to international
terrorist groups. With respect to how
close Iraq is to developing a nuclear
weapon, Bush notes that "we don't know
exactly, and that's the problem." He
went on to state that "If the Iraqi
regime is able to produce, buy, or steal
an amount of highly enriched uranium a
little larger than a single softball, it
could have a nuclear weapon in less than
a year."
Document 17: Letter, George J.
Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, to
Senator Bob Graham, Chairman of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, October 7,
2002. Unclassified.
Source:
http://www.globalsecurity.org
This letter from the DCI provided an
unclassified CIA assessment of Saddam
Hussein's willingness to use weapons of
mass destruction. According to the
letter, Iraq "for now appears to be
drawing a line short of conducting
terrorist attacks with conventional or
... chemical and biological weapons
against the United States," but if
"Saddam should conclude that a U.S.-led
attack could no longer be deterred, he
probably would become much less
constrained in adopting terrorist
actions." The letter also discusses the
question of Iraqi links to Al-Qaeda and
the basis for U.S. assessments of the
links.
Document 18: DoD, Iraqi Denial
and Deception for Weapons of Mass
Destruction & Ballistic Missile Programs,
October 8, 2002. Unclassified.
Source:
http://www.defenselink.mil
The day after President Bush's
Cincinnati speech (Document
12), the Defense Department provided
a briefing on Iraqi denial and deception
activities with respect to their WMD
programs. These slides were used in the
presentation. They include a variety of
satellite photographs (from commercial
as well as a intelligence satellites),
tables, and charts that concern Iraq's
assorted programs and select facilities
(for example, the Abu Ghurayb BW
Facility). In addition, the presentation
focused on Iraq's denial and deception
strategy and concealment apparatus.
Document 19: George W. Bush,
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction, December 2002.
Unclassified.
Source:
http://www.whitehouse.gov
This strategy document is an
unclassified extract of Top Secret
National Security Presidential Directive
17.(2)
The unclassified version asserts that
"We will not permit the world's most
dangerous regimes and terrorists to
threaten us with the world's most
destructive weapons." It also notes that
"because deterrence may not succeed ...
U.S. military forces and appropriate
civilian agencies must have the
capability to defend against WMD-armed
adversaries, including in appropriate
cases through pre-emptive measures."
Document 20: Table of Contents,
Currently Accurate, Full and Complete
Declaration December 7, 2002, w/covering
letter from Mohammed A. Aldouri, Permanent
Representative to the U.N.
Source:
http://www.fas.org
This table of contents describes the
content of the report submitted by Iraq
to the United Nations with regard to its
nuclear, chemical, biological, and
missile programs, as required by
U.N.Security Council Resolution 1441. It
shows the varied methods Iraq used in
trying to produce nuclear material
suitable for a weapon as well as the
large number of sites involved in the
nuclear program.
Document 21: Kenneth Katzman,
Congressional Research Service, Iraq:
Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and
U.S. Policy, December 10, 2002.
Unclassified.
Source:
http://www.house.gov/shays/CRS/CRSProducts.htm
This paper, updated from an earlier
version, discusses a number of issues
concerning Iraq. Outside of the WMD
area, it examines human rights/war crime
issues, international terrorism,
Iraq-Kuwait issues, reparation payments,
sanctions, and the oil-for- food
program. With respect to weapons of mass
destruction, it focuses largely on the
U.N. resolutions placing limits on Iraqi
WMD programs and the work of U.N.
inspectors in attempting to monitor
Iraqi chemical, biological, missile, and
nuclear programs.
Document 22 : Department of
State, Fact Sheet: Illustrative Examples
of Omissions From the Iraqi Declaration to
the United Nations Security Council,
December 19, 2002.
Source:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/16118pf.htm
At a December 19 press conference,
Secretary of State Colin Powell stated
that U.S. experts found the Iraqi
declaration "to be anything but
currently accurate, full, or complete."
He also charged that the declaration
"totally fails to meet the resolution's
requirements." The same day the State
Department issued a fact sheet providing
several examples of omissions from the
declaration.
Document 23 : Hans Blix, An
Update on Inspection, January 27, 2003.
Source:
http://www.un.org
In Resolution 1441, adopted in
November 2002, the U.N. Security Council
called for progress reports from UNMOVIC
and the IAEA two months after renewing
inspections in Iraq. As head of UNMOVIC,
Blix is responsible for overseeing
inspections whose objective is to verify
Iraqi chemical and biological warfare
disarmament. Part of Blix's report
reviews the sequence and content of U.N.
resolutions dealing with the disarmament
of Iraq.
The key part of his paper, however,
deals with the extent of Iraqi
cooperation - with regard to both
substance and process. With regard to
process, while he states that "Iraq has
on the whole cooperated rather well so
far with UNMOVIC in this field," he does
note a number of problems, including
Iraq's refusal to guarantee the safety
of proposed U.N. U-2 overflights as well
as it insistence on sending helicopters
into the no-fly zone to transport the
Iraqis who serve as the inspectors
minders. In addition, Blix notes "some
recent disturbing incidents and
harassment."
With regard to cooperation on
substance, Blix's report is more
negative, noting that Iraq has failed to
engage in the "active" cooperation
called for in Resolution 1441. He
questions Iraqi claims concerning the
quality, quantity, and disposition of VX
nerve gas produced by Iraq as well as
claims that Iraq destroyed 8, 500 liters
of anthrax. In addition, he reports that
Iraq has tested two missiles in excess
of the permitted range of 150
kilometers.
The final portion of the report
specifies how the inspection process can
be made more fruitful - including the
turning over of more relevant documents,
lists of key personnel, and the
facilitation of credible interviews.
Document 24: Dr. Mohammed ElBaradei,
The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq,
January 27, 2003 w/att: IAEA Update Report
for the Security Council Pursuant to
Resolution 1441 (2002), January 27, 2003.
Source:
http://www.iaea.org
While UNMOVIC handled inspections
relating to chemical and biological
weapons, the IAEA was charged with
trying to verify Iraqi nuclear
disarmament. This report from the IAEA
director ElBaradei's update report
provides background on previous
resolutions, the IAEA's findings before
the end of inspections in 1998, and his
agency's activities since the resumption
of the inspection regime on November 27.
The review of agency activities
addresses the establishment of a Baghdad
field office, Iraq's declarations
pertaining to the status of its nuclear
program, the request for and discovery
of relevant documents, the inventory of
nuclear material, ongoing monitoring,
interviews, and specific issues raised
by states - including the U.S. charge
that aluminum tubes procured by Iraq
were intended for use in centrifuges.
While in his cover letter ElBaradei
observes that "we have to date found no
evidence that Iraq has revived its
nuclear weapons programme since the
elimination of the programme in the
1990s," in the update report it is also
noted that "little progress has been
made in resolving the questions and
concerns that remained as of 1998" and
that "further verification activities
will be necessary before the IAEA will
be able to provide credible assurance
that Iraq has no nuclear weapons
programme."
Document 25: Colin L. Powell,
Briefing on the Iraq Weapons Inspectors'
60-Day Report: Iraqi Non-Cooperation and
Defiance of the UN, January 27, 2003.
Source:
http://www.state.gov
The same day that Blix and ElBaradei
addressed the UN, U.S. Secretary of
State Colin Powell gave a short briefing
to reporters on the U.S. view of those
reports, followed by a question and
answer session. Powell noted the
statement by Blix that "Iraq appears not
to have come to a genuine acceptance,
not even today, of the disarmament that
was demanded of it." The secretary went
on to mention several specific issues,
including Iraqi failure to account for
the anthrax and VX it had produced, as
well as the development of missiles
exceeding the allowed range. Powell also
noted impediments to the work of the
inspectors, including "a swarm of Iraqi
minders," an incomplete list of Iraqi
personnel involved in WMD programs, and
the inability of the inspectors to
interview Iraqi scientists in private.
Document 26: The White House,
What Does Disarmament Look Like?,
January 2003.
Source:
http://www.whitehouse.gov
As part of pressing its case that
Iraq was not truly willing to disarm,
the Bush administration released this
short paper contrasting the nuclear
disarmament process in three other
countries - South Africa, the Ukraine,
and Kazakhstan - with Iraqi behavior. It
identified several characteristics of
importance - high level political
commitment, national initiatives to
dismantle weapons of mass destruction,
and full cooperation and transparency.
It then asserts that "the behavior of
the Iraqi regime contrasts sharply with
successful disarmament examples." It
goes on to note the activities of
several Iraqi organizations, including
the Special Security Organization, and
the National Monitoring Directorate, and
the areas where Iraq's "currently
accurate, full, and complete"
declaration" falls short - including
with respect to biological agents,
ballistic missiles, and attempts to
procure uranium.
Document 27: Colin L. Powell,
Remarks to the United Nations Security
Council, February 5, 2003.
Source:
http://www.state.gov
In the face of requests and demands
that the U.S. provide further evidence
in support of its position that Iraq was
failing to comply with U.N. resolution
1441, was impeding the work of UNMOVIC
and IAEA inspectors, and that a resort
to military force would be necessary
unless Iraq's behavior changed,
Secretary of State Colin Powell
addressed the U.N. Security Council. The
bulk of Powell's remarks, as contained
in the transcript, involved his
provision of "additional information
[about] what the United States knows
about Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction, as well as Iraq's
involvement in terrorism ..."
The intelligence provided came from a
variety of sources - including satellite
imagery, communications intercepts,
human assets in Iraq, detainees, and
defectors. It represents the largest
single public disclosure of such
information made in support of U.S.
diplomacy - surpassing the scope and
volume of disclosures made during the
Cuban missile crisis or the campaign in
response to the Soviet Union's shootdown
of KAL 007 in 1983.
The transcript contains Powell's
reading of intercepts, and his
description of the content of satellite
imagery being shown to the Security
Council. It also contains his
description of organizations and
activities, information about which was
obtained from human sources and/or
unspecified communications intelligence
- such as the existence of a "Higher
Committee for Monitoring the Inspections
Teams" as well as the presence of
Al-Qaida associates in Baghdad.
Document 28: Department of State,
Iraq: Failing to Disarm - U.S. Secretary of
State Powell's Presentation to the UN
Security Council, February 5, 2003.
Source:
http://www.state.gov
This Powerpoint presentation provided
an overview of part of Secretary
Powell's remarks. It contains a selected
portion of intercepts concerning and a
satellite image pertaining to Iraq's
hiding of evidence, charges that Iraq is
muzzling its scientists and
specifications of how that is being
done, the assertion that Iraq is still
seeking nuclear weapons (with reference
to intercepted aluminum tubes), and the
charge that Iraq is harboring
terrorists, including Al-Qaida
representatives.
Document 29: U.S. Department of
State, Iraq: Failing to Disarm,
February 5, 2003.
Source:
http://www.state.gov
These images constitute the full set
of slides used by Secretary Powell in
support of his presentation. They
contain the full text presented of
intercepts, all nine satellite images,
and other slides.
Document 30 : Dr. Hans Blix,
Briefing of the Security Council,
February 14, 2003.
Source:
http://www.un.org
In accordance with UN Resolution
1441, UNMOVIC chief Hans Blix delivered
a progress on his organizations
activities in Iraq, its findings, and
Iraqi compliance with the resolution.
Blix noted that "so far UNMOVIC has
not found any [weapons of mass
destruction], only a small number of
chemical munitions which should have
been declared and destroyed." However,
he also noted that many proscribed
programs had not been accounted for, a
matter that he characterized as being of
"great significance." He specifically
mentioned programs for the production of
anthrax, VX nerve gas, and long-range
missiles. He also noted the status of
UNMOVIC investigations of the Al-Samoud
and Al-Fatah missiles as well as casting
chambers. With regard to Iraqi actions,
he reported that Iraq had formed two
commissions to search for relevant
documents and that the National
Monitoring Directorate had provided a
list of 83 individuals who could
allegedly verify destruction of chemical
weapons and expresses his hope that Iraq
will draw up a similar of individuals
who participated in the destruction of
biological warfare items.
Document 31 : Dr. Mohammed El
Baradei, The Status of Nuclear
Inspections in Iraq: 14 February 2003 Update,
February 14, 2003.
Source:
http://www.iaea.org
In his update report,
the director of the IAEA noted that his
agency's inspections had moved from the
"reconnaissance phase" (aimed at
re-establishing knowledge of Iraqi
nuclear capabilities) into the
"investigative phase" (achieving an
understanding of Iraqi capabilities over
the previous four years).
He also reported on
the status of the inspection process -
noting that in the preceding two weeks
the IAEA had conducted 38 inspections at
19 sites, and that its methods included
sampling air, water, and sediment, as
well as the use of hand-held and
car-borne gamma-ray detectors. With
respect to specific issues he addressed,
among others, uranium acquisition,
uranium enrichment, and the high
explosive, HMX.
Similarly to Blix, he
reported that "we have to date found no
evidence of nuclear or nuclear related
activities in Iraq," but that "a number
of issues are still under
investigation." ElBaradei also noted
that a new document provided by Iraq
contained "no new information," and
expressed the hope that the newly
established Iraqi commissions "will be
able to uncover documents and other
evidence that could assist in clarifying
… remaining questions."
Document 32: Central Intelligence
Agency/Defense Intelligence Agency, Iraqi
Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production
Plants, May 28, 2003. Unclassified.
Source:
http://www.cia.gov
In his February 5, 2003, presentation
to the U.N. Security Council, Secretary
of State Colin Powell charged that Iraq
had begun constructing mobile facilities
to produce biological weapons in the
mid-1990s. This program involved, he
charged, the manufacture of mobile
trailers and railcars to produce
biological agents, designed to evade
U.N. inspectors. Agent production
reportedly took place from Thursday
night through Friday, a period during
which the United Nations did not conduct
inspections due to the Muslim holiday.
This paper presents a joint CIA-DIA
evaluation of two specialized
tractor-trailers and a mobile laboratory
truck discovered in Iraq after the U.S.
invasion. Kurdish forces took one
tractor-trailer into custody near Mosul
in late April. U.S. troops discovered
the other in early May, at the al-Kindi
Research, Testing, Development, and
Engineering Facility in Mosul. U.S.
troops also found the mobile laboratory,
in late April. The CIA and DIA analysts
concluded that the discoveries
constituted "the strongest evidence to
date that Iraq was hiding a biological
warfare program."
The text of this paper reviews the
Intelligence Community's pre-war sources
on the Iraqi mobile program (including a
chemical engineer, a civil engineer, and
a defector from the Iraqi Intelligence
Service), and the Community's pre-war
assessment of the program. The paper
also asserts that the discovered plants
are consistent with intelligence
reports, and that legitimate uses,
including hydrogen production, are
unlikely.
According to a subsequent New York
Times report, engineers from the Defense
Intelligence Agency who examined the
trailers concluded in June that the
vehicles were probably used to produce
hydrogen for artillery weather balloons,
as the Iraqi had claimed.
Document 33 : CIA Statement on
Recently Acquired Iraqi Centrifuge
Equipment, June 26, 2003.
Source:
http://www.cia.gov/cia/wmd/iraqi_centrifuge_equipment.htm
After Saddam Hussein's regime was
deposed in March 2003, Dr. Mahdi Shukur
Ubaydi, who headed Iraq's uranium
enrichment program before 1991, turned
over to U.S. officials in Baghdad a
volume of centrifuge documents and
components he had hidden in his garden.
This brief CIA statement reports on
some of what Dr. Ubaydi told U.S.
officials. The images, which were
removed from the CIA's web page shortly
after their initial appearance, include
both photographs of centrifuge parts and
blueprints.
Document 34: House of Commons
Foreign Affairs Committee, The Decision
to go to War in Iraq: Ninth Report of
Session 2002-03, Volume I (London: The
Stationary Office
Limited, July 2003). Unclassified.
Source:
http://www.uk.gov
The primary purpose of this document
is to report the committee's assessment
of whether the British Parliament
received "accurate and complete"
information from the government in the
period leading up to military action in
Iraq - particularly with respect to
weapons of mass destruction.
The two key sections of the report
examine the claims made in the
government's
September and February "dossiers,"
including assertions concerning Iraq's
chemical and biological weapons
capability, its long-range missile
effort, its nuclear weapons program,
Iraq's alleged attempt to acquire
uranium from Africa, and the assertion
that Iraqi forces could deploy chemical
or biological weapons within 45 minutes
of being given an order to do so.
The report also contains 33
conclusions and recommendations. The
committee
concluded that the government genuinely
perceived "a real and present danger"
from Iraq, that in the absence of
significant human intelligence Britain
was heavily dependent on US technical
intelligence, defectors, and exiles
"with an agenda of their own," and that
the accuracy of British assessments
could not yet be determined.
Document 35: Statement by Director
of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet on
the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on
Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of
Mass Destruction, August 11, 2003.
Source:
http://cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/press_release/2003/pr08112003.htm
In the face of criticism in the press
and Congress over the apparent
disparities between the claims of the
October 2002 National Intelligence
Estimate on Iraqi WMD and the failure to
find weapons stocks or open production
lines in the aftermath of the war, DCI
Tenet issued this statement in defense
of the estimate.
He characterizes much of the
commentary as "misinformed, misleading,
and just plain wrong," and goes on to
state that "we stand by the judgments in
the NIE," and promises that after the
Iraq Survey Group completes its work,
"but not before," the Intelligence
Community, "will stand back to
professionally review where were are."
Tenet's statement goes on to defend
the consistency of the community's
analysis concerning Iraqi programs as
well as its collection efforts after the
departure of U.N. inspectors in 1998. He
then proceeds to examine intelligence
performance with each component of Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction programs -
nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons, and delivery systems.
The most extensive part of his
statement is a defense of the estimate's
judgment that Iraq was seeking to
reconstitute its nuclear weapons
program. He states that this conclusion
was based on six factors, which did not
include its reported attempt to acquire
uranium from Africa. In addition, he
describes the alternative views within
the Intelligence Community as to whether
Iraq was attempting to obtain
high-strength aluminum tubes for use in
uranium enrichment or for conventional
military uses.
Document 36: House of Commons
Intelligence and Security Committee,
Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction -
Intelligence and Assessments (London:
The Stationery Office Limited, September
2003). Unclassified.
Source:
http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/reports/isc/
The House of Commons Intelligence and
Security Committee defined the objective
of their report as determining "whether
the available intelligence, which
informed the decision to invade Iraq,
was adequate and properly assessed and
whether it was accurately reflected in
[British] Government publications."
The initial portions of the report
provide overviews of the committee's
investigation, of the intelligence
assessment organizations (the Joint
Intelligence Committee and Assessments
Staff), and of JIC assessments from
August 1990 to September 2002. The
subsequent parts of the study focus on
the September 2002 dossier (including
the claims that Iraqi forces could
deploy chemical or biological weapons
within 45 minutes and had sought to
purchase uranium from Africa),
assessments from October 2002 to March
2003, the February 2003 document on
Iraqi denial and deception (which
included substantial portions, without
attribution, from a previously
published, non-governmental analysis),
and several other issues, including
intelligence support to U.N. inspectors.
The report includes twenty-six
conclusions and recommendations
concerning a variety of topics -
including the adequacy of the Secret
Intelligence Service's human
intelligence effort in Iraq, whether it
was reasonable that British intelligence
analysts drew the conclusions they did
given the available intelligence on
Iraqi WMD programs, how quickly it
appeared Iraqi forces could employ
chemical or biological weapons, and
decisions to include or exclude certain
information or conclusions about Iraqi
capabilities and the extent of the
threat posed to Britain.
Document 37: Letter, Porter J. Goss
and Jane Harman, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, to George J.
Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence,
September 25,
2003. Unclassified.
Source:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A36817-2003Oct2?language=printer
This letter criticizes the
Intelligence Community's performance in
providing intelligence related to Iraq's
chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons programs, as well as with
respect to Iraqi ties to al-Qaeda. Goss
and Harman, the committee's chairman and
vice chairman, respectively, write that
a "dearth of post-1998 underlying
intelligence reflects a weakness in
intelligence collection" - pointing to
past committee concerns about
inadequacies in human intelligence
(HUMINT) and measurement and signature
intelligence (MASINT) crucial to
producing accurate assessments on
weapons of mass destruction and
terrorism. The "lack of specific
intelligence on regime plans and
intentions, WMD, and Iraq's support to
terrorist groups appears to have
hampered the IC's ability to provide a
better assessment to policymakers from
1998 through 2003."
Document 38: Letter, George J.
Tenet to Honorable Porter J. Goss, October
1, 2003. Unclassified.
Source:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A36712-2003Oct2?language=printer
In this letter to Porter Goss, the
chairman of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI),
Director of Central Intelligence George
Tenet disputes the contents of the
September 25 letter Tenet received from
Goss and Committee Vice Chairman Jane
Harman. He also criticizes the
Committee's distribution of the letter
to the press "before providing the
Intelligence Community any reasonable
opportunity to respond."
Tenet argues that the HPSCI was not
in a position to fully assess the
Intelligence Community's performance on
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
programs or its ties to al-Qaeda. The
Committee, Tenet charged, had reached
its conclusions without having heard
from David Kay, special advisor to the
Iraq Survey Group - which had been
charged with searching Iraq for weapons
of mass destruction.
Further, Tenet charged that the
Committee's assertion that the
Intelligence Community did not challenge
longstanding judgments and assessments
was "simply wrong." He also accused the
Committee of having failed to try to
understand the scope of U.S. collection
activities targeted against Iraqi WMD
programs.
Document 39: Statement by David Kay
on the Interim Progress Report of the Iraq
Survey Group (ISG) before the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
the House Committee on Appropriations,
Subcommittee on Defense, and the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, October 2,
2003. Unclassified.
Source:
http://cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2003/david_kay_10022003.html
In the aftermath of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, coalition forces failed to
uncover production facilities for, or
stocks of, weapons of mass destruction.
To improve the chances of success, an
Iraq Survey Group was established under
the direction of Maj. Gen. Keith Dayton,
the chief of the Defense Intelligence
Agency's Directorate of Operations. Dr.
David Kay, who served as a U.N. weapon
inspector for several years after the
1991 Persian Gulf War, was appointed as
a special advisor to the group, and
would direct the group's operations in
Iraq.
Kay's October 2 presentation to the
Congressional committees provides an
unclassified summary of the group's
interim report. Kay told the attending
members that the ISG had not yet found
stocks of weapons, but was not at a
point where it could be determined
definitively that such weapons stocks
did not exist or that they existed
before the war but had been relocated.
Kay also noted a number of factors
that had hindered the ISG's search -
including the compartmentalization of
Iraqi WMD programs, deliberate
dispersion and destruction of material
and documentation related to those
programs, post-war looting, and a "far
from permissive environment" for search
activities.
In addition, Kay summarized some of
the Survey Group's discoveries, which
included: a clandestine network of
laboratories and safe-houses controlled
by the Iraqi Intelligence Services
containing equipment suitable for CBW
research; reference strains of
biological organisms concealed in a
scientists home; documents and equipment
hidden in scientists' homes that could
be used for resuming uranium enrichment
activities; and a continuing covert
capability to manufacture fuel
propellant useful only for prohibited
SCUD missiles.
Document 40 : Stuart Cohen, Iraq's
WMD Programs: Culling Hard Facts from Soft
Myths, November 26, 2003. Unclassified.
Source:
http://www.cia.gov/nic/speeches_iraq_wmd.htm
The author of this essay served as
acting chairman of the National
Intelligence Council when the October
2002 National Intelligence Estimate on
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was
written. Cohen argues that "no
reasonable person" who examined the
"millions of pages" of information
available would have reached
"conclusions or alternative views that
were profoundly different" from those
reached by the CIA and the nation's
other intelligence agencies.
Cohen goes on to identify and dispute
what he characterizes as ten myths
concerning the October 2002 estimate,
including "the estimate favored going to
war," "analysts were pressured to change
judgments to meet the needs of the Bush
administration," divergent views were
buried and uncertainties concealed,
"major NIE judgments were based on
single sources," and "analysts
overcompensated for having
underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."
Document 41: Congresswoman Jane
Harman, "The Intelligence on Iraq's WMD:
Looking Back to Look Forward," January 16,
2004.
Source:
http://www.house.gov/harman/press/releases/2004/011604_WAC.html
This speech given by the Jane Harman
(D-CA), the vice chairman of the House
Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, characterized the October
2002 National Intelligence Estimate on
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
programs as "significantly flawed." She
singled out two specific conclusions -
that Iraq possessed chemical and
biological weapons, and that it was
reconstituting its nuclear weapons
program, noting that "these were the
centerpieces of the NIE and of the case
for war and it appears likely that both
were wrong."
Harman went on to call for creation
of a Director of National Intelligence
who would serve as a member of the
president's cabinet, increased
collaboration within the intelligence
community, and "virtual reorganization"
- creating "task forces" through altered
personnel policies and providing virtual
workplaces.
Document 42: Transcript of David Kay
testimony before Senate Armed Services
Committee, January 28, 2004
Source:
http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/
pdf/Iraq/kaytestimony.pdf
David Kay appeared before the Senate
Armed Services Committee shortly after
he resigned as special advisor to the
Iraq Survey Group. Kay states, referring
to the expectation that there would be
substantial stocks of, and production
lines for, chemical and biological
weapons in Iraq, that "we were almost
all wrong, and I certainly include
myself here." He also notes that other
foreign intelligence agencies, including
the French and the German, also had
believed that Iraq possessed such stocks
and production lines. In addition, he
discusses the issue of whether political
pressure had any impact on the content
of the October 2002 national
intelligence estimate (Document
15). Kay also notes that "based on
the work of the Iraq Survey Group … Iraq
was in clear violation of the terms of
[U.N.] Resolution 1441. He goes on to
note the discovery of hundreds of
instances of activities prohibited by
U.N. Resolution 687.
Document 43: George J. Tenet, Iraq
and Weapons of Mass Destruction, remarks
prepared for delivery at Georgetown
University February 5, 2004.
Source:
http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2004/tenet_georgetownspeech_02052004.html
In the midst of the continuing
post-war controversy over intelligence
estimates of Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction program, Director of Central
Intelligence George Tenet gave this
speech in which he addressed "how the
United States intelligence community
evaluated Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction programs over the past
decade, leading to a National
Intelligence Estimate in October of
2002."
In his talk, Tenet reviewed the
"three streams of information" available
concerning Iraqi WMD programs - Iraq's
history, the inability of Iraq to
account for weapons that it possessed at
the time of the 1991 Gulf War, and
information obtained after U.N.
inspectors left Iraq in 1998. He also
compared the estimate's descriptions of
Iraqi WMD activities with what has been
discovered by the Iraq Survey Group. He
argued that "it would have been
difficult for analysts to come to any
different conclusions than the ones
reached in October of 2002," but went on
to say that "in our business that is not
good enough."
Tenet also spoke about the role of
U.S. and British intelligence in
monitoring Libyan WMD, the activities of
Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan,
and related topics.
Notes
1. George W. Bush, National Security
Directive 54, Responding to Iraqi Aggression
in the Gulf, January 15, 1991. Top Secret.
See National Security Archive Electronic
Briefing Book Number 39, Operation Desert
Storm: Ten Years After, January 17, 2001,
Document 4.
2. See Sharon A. Squassoni, Congressional
Research Service, Iraq: U.N. Inspections for
Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 7,
2003, pp. 13-14.
3. Accounts of the war and the diplomatic
battles prior to it, include Todd S. Purdum,
A Time of Our Choosing: America's War in
Iraq (New York: Times Books, 2003); William
Shawcross, Allies: The U.S., Britain,
Europe, and the War in Iraq (New York:
Public Affairs, 2004).
4. James Risen, "U.S. Asks Ex-U.N.
Inspector To Advise on Arms Search," New
York Times, June 12, 2003, p. A14; Central
Intelligence Agency, "DCI Tenet Announces
Appointment of David Kay as Special
Advisor," June 11, 2003, (available at
www.cia.gov); Kenneth Gerhart, "The Changing
Face of ISG's Home Base," Communique,
July-August 2003, pp.5-7.
5. On the various element of the
controversy, see Kenneth M. Pollack, "Spies,
Lies, and Weapons: What Went Wrong," The
Atlantic, January 2004, pp. 78-92; Joseph
Cirincione, Jessica T. Matthews, and George
Perkovich, WMD in Iraq: evidence and
implications (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2004);
Thomas Powers, "The Vanishing Case for War,"
New York Review of Books, December 4, 2003,
pp. 12-17. With regard to the possibility
that human sources knowingly provided false
information on weapons of mass destruction
as well as Saddam's whereabouts on the
opening night of the war, see Bob Drogin,
"U.S. Suspects It Received False Iraq Arms
Tips," Los Angeles Times, August 28, 2003;
Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "Inside
the Ring," Washington Times, January 2,
2004, p. A7.
6. See note 5, the citations for Pollack;
Cirincione, Matthews and Perkovich; and
Powers.
7. Joby Warrick, "Some Evidence on Iraq
Called Fake," Washington Post, March 8,
2003, pp. A1, A18.
8. Mike Allen and Barton Gellman,
"Preemptive Strikes Part of U.S. Strategic
Doctrine," Washington Post, December 11,
2002, pp. A1, A26.
9. Douglas Jehl, "Iraqi Trailers Said to
Make Hydrogen Not Biological Arms," New York
Times, August 9, 2003, pp. A1,
For Further Reading
David Albright, Iraq's Aluminum Tubes:
Separating Fact from Fiction, December
5, 2003, (available at
http://www.isis-online.org)
Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Matthews,
and George Perkovich, WMD in Iraq:
evidence and implications (Washington,
D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2004) (available at
http://www.ceip.org)
Anthony Cordesman, Intelligence and
Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction: The
Lessons from the Iraq War, July 1, 2003
(available at
http://www.csis.org)
Barton Gellman, "Iraq's Arsenal Was Only
on Paper," Washington Post, January
7, 2004, pp. A1, A14-A15.
International Institute for Strategic
Studies, Iraq's Weapons of Mass
Destruction: A Net Assessment (London:
IISS, September 2003).
Kenneth M. Pollack, "Spies, Lies, and
Weapons: What Went Wrong," The Atlantic,
January 2004, pp. 78-92 (also available at
http://www.theatlantic.com)
Thomas Powers, "The Vanishing Case for
War," New York Review of Books,
December 4, 2003, pp. 12-17
Reference...
